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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an 
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court set forth the following factual background for this case: 
May shot victim James Lambert in the leg with a 9mm pistol on May 
29, 2010. He was charged with aggravated battery by using a firearm in 
the commission of a battery, and not with the aggravated battery offense 
of causing great bodily harm. There is no dispute that he in fact shot 
Lambert, although he now contends he didn't intend to shoot him. There 
is also no dispute that he had consumed significant amounts of 
methamphetamine and alcohol in the 10-12 days prior to the incident. 
May contends that he was suffering from hallucinations during the incident 
and therefore suffered from a mental illness which might have provided a 
defense in this case. No evidence supporting this contention, other than 
May's testimony and some confirming testimony of his mother, was 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. A psychological report prepared 
following his plea and prior to sentencing concludes that May was 
"feigning psychotic symptoms." The eluding charge arose when May fled 
the scene of the shooting. He admitted at the change of plea hearing that 
"I saw the lights, sirens, and I didn't pull over." 
May was initially represented by Ben Anderson of the Twin Falls 
Public Defender's Office. The relationship between May and Anderson 
can best be described as "rocky." At times attorney and client got along 
well. At other times they did not. One of the primary disputes between 
attorney and client surrounded May's desire to defend this case based 
upon being shot by police after the incident with Lambert, and Anderson's 
disagreement with that approach. In addition, May told Anderson several 
versions of the event which made formulation of a defense difficult. 
May received and rejected several plea offers from the State before 
finally accepting the final one forming the basis of his plea. By that plea 
agreement the State recommended a 10-30 year sentence on the felony 
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and 6 months in jail on the misdemeanor. May was free to argue for a 
lesser sentence. On the day of his plea Anderson met with May in the jail 
and a Guilty Plea Advisory Form was filled out. The final plea agreement 
was also signed that day. Pleas were entered the same day and a 
transcript of that plea hearing is part of the record before the Court. May 
then filed a motion to withdraw his plea. 
After entering his pleas, Attorney Tim Williams was appointed to 
represent May. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw plea 
was conducted and the Court denied the motion to withdraw his pleas. 
May proceeded to sentencing. The trial court followed the State's 
sentencing recommendation. May appealed. In its opinion, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that "May was not pressured, that he understood the 
sentencing terms, and that his acceptance of the plea agreement was 
made voluntarily and knowingly." Specifically, the Court noted that May, 
during the plea colloquy, May [sic] said "yes" []when asked if he knew he 
could serve thirty years without parole. 
(R., pp.72-74.) 
May filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that he was innocent of the charges, and that he 
was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.10-15.) The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on May's petition. (R., pp.65-69.) Following the evidentiary hearing, 
the district court denied May's post-conviction petition. (R., pp.71-82.) May filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.) 
2 
ISSUES 
May raises two issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a plea withdrawal: and 
whether the district court erred in determining that Mr. May's plea was 
knowing; willing; and without duress? 
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. May's post-
conviction petition without applying an actual innocence standard of 
review-and allowing evidentiary processes to make such an [sic] 
determination[.] 
(See Appellant's brief, p.4 (capitalization altered).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The issue of whether May was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea was the subject 
of his previous appeal in Docket No. 38835. Is he precluded under the doctrine of res 
judicata from re-litigating this issue? 
2. Has May failed to show error in the district court's dismissal, following an 




Claims That Have Previously Been Raised To And Decided By The Court Are Barred 
Under The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
A. Introduction 
The issue of whether May is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea has previously 
been raised to and decided by the Court of Appeals. This issue is therefore precluded 
by the doctrine of res judicata. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata is a 
question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Rhoades, 
134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000). 
C. May's Claim That He Is Entitled To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Is Barred Under 
The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been 
previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same 
litigants. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. Similarly, claims which could 
have been raised to the Court previously but were not are barred in subsequent 
litigation by the principles of res judicata. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988). On May's prior appeal in Docket No. 38835, he argued that he 
was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. May. Docket No. 38835, 2012 
Unpublished Op. No. 566, 2 (Idaho Appeals, July 31, 2012). The Court of Appeals 
determined that he was not. See 19.:. at 4-6. Because this issue has been raised to and 
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decided by the Court previously, it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata and is not 
properly before this Court. 
11. 
May Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that, far from 
proving his claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel by a 
preponderance of the evidence, May's claims were in fact disproved by the evidence, 
and so denied his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.71-80.) On appeal, May contends 
that he should have been granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel and 
alleged actual innocence. (See Appellant's brief.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to May's claims, however, shows that he failed to prove either claim. The 
court properly denied May's petition for post-conviction relief and should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied May's Post-Conviction Petition 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based. I.C.R. 
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57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). At an evidentiary 
hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within the province of the trial 
court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). The 
district court's factual findings will not be disturbed if "supported by substantial, even if 
conflicting, evidence in the record." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 
941,943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)). 
On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower court's decision that the 
burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, and a finding that a party 
has failed to prove his claim will not be set aside unless that finding is clearly erroneous. 
Larkin, 115 Idaho at 74, 764 P.2d at 441. 
Applying relevant legal standards to the facts presented at May's evidentiary 
hearing, the district court found that May had failed to prove his post-conviction claims. 
(R., pp.76-80.) Regarding May's naked claim of innocence, the district court recognized 
that such a claim was barred by application of Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b); May's guilt or 
innocence could have been previously litigated and was determined by his guilty plea. 
(Id.) Addressing the relative merits of May's claims, the district court found that his 
testimony was not credible. (Id.) Not only were his assertions unsupported by the 
record, they were in fact affirmatively disproved by it. (R., pp.79-80.) The state adopts 
as part of its argument on appeal the district court's analysis from its "Memorandum 
Opinion," a copy of which is attached as "Appendix A." May has failed to show that the 
district court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
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Instead, May continues to claim ineffective assistance of counsel and assert his 
innocence on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) But he has not shown, nor has he 
even attempted to show, that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. At an 
evidentiary hearing, credibility determinations are the province of the trial court. Larkin, 
115 Idaho at 73, 764 P.2d at 440. And the trial court found that May's testimony was 
not credible. May failed to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. He 
has failed to show that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The order of the district 
court denying and dismissing May's petition should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying May post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2014. 
RUS PENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of December, 2014, served true 
and correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
MARKCUS RAYMOND MAY 
IDOC #99474 
ISCC 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
RJS/pm 
RUSS J.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
8 
APPENDIX A 
• • DISTRICT COURT 
C Fifth Judicial District ounty of Twin Falls • state of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
MARKCUS RA YMONO MAY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
David Haley for Petitioner May. 
Case No. CV 2013-1240 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Stan Holloway for Respondent State. 
INTRODUCTION 
May was originally charged with Aggravated Battery with an enhancement, 
aggravated assault with an enhancement, burglary and felony eluding as a result of 
conduct occurring in May 2010. He proceeded thru a preliminary hearing and after 
numerous plea offers and counteroffers pied guilty to the Aggravated Battery with a 
weapon enhancement and the offense of misdemeanor eluding. He filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. The Court denied that motion. He received a 
sentence of 30 years, 10 fixed and 20 indeterminate on the aggravated battery and 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 1 
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weapons enhancement charge, and a 6 month jail sentence on the eluding charge. 
May appealed the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his sentence 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by unpublished opinion filed July 31, 2013. May 
has timely filed this post-conviction petition. 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on Oct 7, 8 and 10, 2013. The Court 
received testimony from May, his mother and his trial attorneys and various documents, 
mostly from the underlying criminal file. This matter taken under advisement at the end 
of the hearing. This memorandum constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52. 
FACTS 
May shot victim James Lambert in the leg with a 9mm pistol on May 29, 2010. 
He was charged with aggravated battery by using a firearm in the commission of a 
battery, and not with the aggravated battery offense of causing great bodily harm. 
There is no dispute that he in fact shot Lambert, although he now contends he didn't 
intend to shoot him. There is also no dispute that he had consumed significant amounts 
of methamphetamine and alcohol in the 10-12 days prior to the incident. May contends 
that he was suffering from hallucinations during the incident and therefore suffered from 
a mental illness which might have provided a defense in this case. No evidence 
supporting this contention, other than May's testimony and some confirming testimony 
of his mother, was presented at the evidentiary hearing. A psychological report 
prepared following his plea and prior to sentencing concludes that May was "feigning 
psychotic symptoms." The eluding charge arose when May fled the scene of the 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 2 
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shooting. He admitted at the change of plea hearing that "I saw the lights, sirens, and I 
didn't pull over." 
May was initially represented by Ben Anderson of the Twin Falls Public 
Defender's Office. The relationship between May and Anderson can best be described 
as "rocky." At times attorney and client got along well. At other times they did not. One 
of the primary disputes between attorney and client surrounded May's desire to defend 
this case based upon being shot by police after the incident with Lambert, and 
Anderson's disagreement with that approach. In addition, May told Anderson several 
versions of the event which made formulation of a defense difficult. 
May received and rejected several plea offers from the State before finally 
accepting the final one forming the basis of his plea. By that plea agreement the State 
recommended a 10-30 year sentence on the felony and 6 months in jail on the 
misdemeanor. May was free to argue for a lesser sentence. On the day of his plea 
Anderson met with May in the jail and a Guilty Plea Advisory Form was filled out. The 
final plea agreement was also signed that day. Pleas were entered the same day and a 
transcript of that plea hearing is part of the record before the Court. May then filed a 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
After entering his pleas, Attorney Tim Williams was appointed to represent May. 
An evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw plea was conducted and the Court 
denied the motion to withdraw his pleas. May proceeded to sentencing. The trial court 
followed the State's sentencing recommendation. May appealed. In its opinion, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that "May was not pressured, that he understood the 
sentencing terms, and that his acceptance of the plea agreement was made voluntarily 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 3 
73 
- • 
and knowingly." Specifically, the Court noted that May, during the plea colloquy, May 
said "yes" "when asked if he knew he could serve thirty years without parole. 
POST CONVICTION CLAIMS 
May raises numerous claims in his pro se petition that was never amended prior 
to the evidentiary hearing. First, he asserts that the aggravated battery statute is 
unconstitutional. However, at hearing he clarified that he is not challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute, but rather that his is simply not guilty either because he 
didn't intend to shoot Lambert, suffered from a mental illness, or had diminished 
capacity because of drug and alcohol intoxication. 
Next he asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Those claims 
include: a personal (not ethical) conflict of interest between May and Anderson; failing 
to use important evidence; failing to object to improper evidence or testimony; failing to 
properly argue appellate issues; and failure to properly advise May about his plea. 
Specifically he claims that he should have had a competency hearing, that Anderson 
lied and threatened him to plead guilty, Anderson failed to investigate, didn't file a 
motion to challenge the enhancement allegation, failed to pursue defenses, and 
misadvised May of the consequences of a unified sentence. He contends that Williams 
didn't properly prepare him for the hearing on his motion to withdraw plea and didn't 
submit letters from friends or family at sentencing. 
GOVERNING AUTHORITY 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, 
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 
Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 4 
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724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must 
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907: Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 
2002). "An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
civil action[.]" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting 
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628)). The application must contain much more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); 
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records 
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. 
In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
post-conviction procedure act. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 
1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the 
MEMORANDUM OPINION- 5 
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applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. The Strickland two part standard applies to ineffective assistance claims 
arising out of the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). To show prejudice, 
a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, 
[defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Id., McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004). Stated slightly differently the petitioner 
must show that counsel's deficient performance "affected the outcome of the plea 
process." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
A post-conviction proceeding "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy 
incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence of 
conviction." I.C. §19-4901(b). Moreover, "[a]ny issue which could have been raised on 
direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings, unless it appears to the court on the basis of a substantial factual showing 
by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial 
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due 
diligence, have been presented earlier." Id. 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
May's claims for post-conviction relief fail for several reasons. First and 
foremost, his claims are barred by application of LC. §19-4901 (b). In his petition May 
seeks "a new trial." Obviously he cannot have a "new" trial because there never was a 
trial in his case. In effect his motion is to withdraw his plea and have a trial. Virtually 
every issue raised in this post-conviction proceeding save one was explicitly and directly 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 6 
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raised in his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty previously litigated in this case. I.C. 
§ 19-4901 (b) bars this Court from reconsidering those issues which were adversely 
determined against May in his direct appeal. The one exception applicable here is 
May's claim of innocence. That claim was not directly asserted in the hearing on motion 
to withdraw plea. May now raises claims of self-defense, mental incapacity, lack of 
intent and accident. All of the facts giving rise to these claims were known to May 
during the change of plea hearing. That issue could have been raised in the motion to 
withdraw plea and was not. May has not established ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing to raise that issue. Williams testified at the evidentiary hearing that he gave 
May every opportunity to raise these and other issues at the hearing to withdraw plea 
and even asked him open ended questions at the hearing so he could articulate the 
"just cause" necessary to permit withdrawal of his plea. Indeed, May acknowledged his 
guilt at the change of plea hearing and is deemed to waive any defenses to his guilt by 
entry of his plea. Even if these issues had been considered by the trial court this Court 
finds that his claim of innocence would not have been accepted by the trial court. The 
Court finds that all of May's claims are barred by application of the foregoing statute. 
Moreover, this Court does not find that, even accepting May's testimony as true, which 
this court does not, May has not established at the evidentiary hearing that he had a 
viable defense to either aggravated battery or misdemeanor eluding. 
Likewise, May seeks a modification of his sentence. May does not claim that the 
State breached the plea agreement. At most, if relief was granted in this proceeding, 
May would only be entitled to a new sentencing. This Court does not have the authority 
to alter his sentence under the circumstances of this case. His complaint is that he 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 7 
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assumed that the 20 year indeterminate portion of his sentence would be "suspended" 
after he completes the 10 year fixed portion. He claims that Anderson told him this. 
The Court specifically finds against this portion of May's claim. First, May's testimony 
lacks credibility. His testimony to the trial court and this Court is absolutely 
contradictory. Either he perjured himself to the trial court or this Court. The guilty plea 
advisory form advised May of the meaning of an indeterminate sentence. Judge Bevan 
advised May that he could serve the complete 30 years. The plea offers made by May 
himself (2 plus 6 and 3 plus 7) are clear indication that he understood the concept of a 
unified sentence, even if he didn't understand the precise meaning of that word. As Mr. 
Anderson explained at hearing, "suspended" applies to probation cases and there is 
absolutely no evidence before this Court that May ever expected to receive probation in 
this case. If May misunderstood the plea agreement (and the Court does not find that 
he did), it is a consequence of his own action, not ineffective assistance of Anderson. 
May's claims against Williams are likewise meritless. He says that Williams did 
not properly "prep" him for the hearing where he testified in support of his motion to 
withdraw plea. The Court finds that this claim is frivolous and unsupported by the 
record. Williams testified that he spent considerable time with May preparing for the 
hearing. It is not an attorney's job to tell a client what to say in court, and indeed 
Williams did not. He explained the law to May and gave him every opportunity to state 
his reasons for withdrawing his plea. May clearly responded to questions asked by 
Williams and was given the opportunity to expand on other factors constituting "just 
cause" for withdrawal of his plea. See May 12, 2011 Hearing on Motion to Withdraw 
Plea, p. 36. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 8 
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May claims that Williams did not present character evidence at sentencing but 
does not provide in this record what that evidence would have shown or how that could 
have affected the sentence. Williams clearly testified that he would have presented any 
character evidence that in his opinion was meritorious if that evidence was made 
available to him. The decision to present evidence at sentencing is a strategic decision. 
May has not carried his burden of proving either ineffective assistance of counsel or 
prejudice on this issue. 
Dismissal of a post-conviction proceeding is appropriate where the record from 
the criminal action conclusively disproves the essential elements of the petitioner's 
claims. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. App. 1995). "Allegations are insufficient 
for the grant of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record or do not justify relief 
as a matter of law." Gootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (Ct. App. 1996). Such is the case 
here. May's testimony at the evidentiary is absolutely contradicted by his statement's 
under oath at the time of entry of his plea. May asserts that Anderson told him what to 
say when answering the questions on the advisory form. The Court finds that 
Anderson's explanation at evidentiary hearing that he didn't tell May what to say on the 
form (other than that which he acknowledged at hearing) is credible and May's 
testimony in this regard is not credible. At the change of plea hearing May 
acknowledged under oath that he was satisfied with Anderson's representation, 
understood the meaning of a unified sentence, was competent to enter a plea and that 
his plea to the charges waived any defenses he might have. At the end of the plea 
colloquy the trial court found that May understood the nature of the charges to which he 
pied guilty, understood the potential penalties, that the plea was knowing and voluntary, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 9 
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and that he in fact committed the crimes to which he pied guilty. May agreed on the 
record with those findings. The Court finds that the record before the trial court 
conclusively disproves his allegations in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
May must prove both ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice. He has 
proven neither in this case. May's Petition shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
I I ~ ·· 
DATED thisf-1- d§J.,y.,ofOctober, 2013. 
' / r 
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